Wednesday, October 28, 2015
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bill clinton's past rape allegations! its a long list!
ditor's Note: The following story is an update of previously-published information and contains some new material.)
By Daniel J. Harris
& Teresa Hampton
Capitol Hill Blue
Women have been charging Bill Clinton with sexual assault since his days as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford 30 years ago.
A continuing investigation into the President's questionable sexual history reveal incidents that go back as far as Clinton's college days, with more than a dozen women claiming his sexual appetites leave little room for the word ''no.''
Juanita Broaddrick, an Arkansas nursing home operator, told NBC's Lisa Myers five weeks ago she was raped by Clinton. NBC shelved the interview, saying they were confirming all parts of the story, but finally aired it Wednesday night.
Broaddrick finally took her story to The Wall Street Journal, which published her account of the brutal rape at the hands of the future President, followed by The Washington Post and some other publications.
But Capitol Hill Blue has confirmed that Broaddrick's story is only one account of many attempted and actual sexual assaults by Clinton that go back 30 years. Among the other incidents:
Eileen Wellstone, 19-year-old English woman who said Clinton sexually assaulted her after she met him at a pub near the Oxford where the future President was a student in 1969. A retired State Department employee, who asked not to be identified, confirmed that he spoke with the family of the girl and filed a report with his superiors. Clinton admitted having sex with the girl, but claimed it was consensual. The victim's family declined to pursue the case;
In 1972, a 22-year-old woman told campus police at Yale University that she was sexually assaulted by Clinton, a law student at the college. No charges were filed, but retired campus policemen contacted by Capitol Hill Blue confirmed the incident. The woman, tracked down by Capitol Hill Blue last week, confirmed the incident, but declined to discuss it further and would not give permission to use her name;
In 1974, a female student at the University of Arkansas complained that then-law school instructor Bill Clinton tried to prevent her from leaving his office during a conference. She said he groped her and forced his hand inside her blouse. She complained to her faculty advisor who confronted Clinton, but Clinton claimed the student ''came on'' to him. The student left the school shortly after the incident. Reached at her home in Texas, the former student confirmed the incident, but declined to go on the record with her account. Several former students at the University have confirmed the incident in confidential interviews and said there were other reports of Clinton attempting to force himself on female students;
Broaddrick, a volunteer in Clinton's gubernatorial campaign, said he raped her in 1978. Mrs. Broaddrick suffered a bruised and torn lip, which she said she suffered when Clinton bit her during the rape;
From 1978-1980, during Clinton's first term as governor of Arkansas, state troopers assigned to protect the governor were aware of at least seven complaints from women who said Clinton forced, or attempted to force, himself on them sexually. One retired state trooper said in an interview that the common joke among those assigned to protect Clinton was "who's next?". One former state trooper said other troopers would often escort women to the governor's hotel room after political events, often more than one an evening;
Carolyn Moffet, a legal secretary in Little Rock in 1979, said she met then-governor Clinton at a political fundraiser and shortly thereafter received an invitation to meet the governor in his hotel room. "I was escorted there by a state trooper. When I went in, he was sitting on a couch, wearing only an undershirt. He pointed at his penis and told me to suck it. I told him I didn't even do that for my boyfriend and he got mad, grabbed my head and shoved it into his lap. I pulled away from him and ran out of the room."
Elizabeth Ward, the Miss Arkansas who won the Miss America crown in 1982, told friends she was forced by Clinton to have sex with him shortly after she won her state crown. Last year, Ward, who is now married with the last name of Gracen (from her first marriage), told an interviewer she did have sex with Clinton but said it was consensual. Close friends of Ward, however, say she still maintains privately that Clinton forced himself on her.
Paula Corbin, an Arkansas state worker, filed a sexual harassment case against Clinton after an encounter in a Little Rock hotel room where the then-governor exposed himself and demanded oral sex. Clinton settled the case with Jones recently with an $850,000 cash payment.
Sandra Allen James, a former Washington, DC, political fundraiser says Presidential candidate-to-be Clinton invited her to his hotel room during a political trip to the nation's capital in 1991, pinned her against the wall and stuck his hand up her dress. She says she screamed loud enough for the Arkansas State Trooper stationed outside the hotel suite to bang on the door and ask if everything was all right, at which point Clinton released her and she fled the room. When she reported the incident to her boss, he advised her to keep her mouth shut if she wanted to keep working. Miss James has since married and left Washington. Reached at her home last week, the former Miss James said she later learned that other women suffered the same fate at Clinton's hands when he was in Washington during his Presidential run.
Christy Zercher, a flight attendant on Clinton's leased campaign plane in 1992, says Presidential candidate Clinton exposed himself to her, grabbed her breasts and made explicit remarks about oral sex. A video shot on board the plane by ABC News shows an obviously inebriated Clinton with his hand between another young flight attendant's legs. Zercher said later in an interview that White House attorney Bruce Lindsey tried to pressure her into not going public about the assault.
Kathleen Willey, a White House volunteer, reported that Clinton grabbed her, fondled her breast and pressed her hand against his genitals during an Oval Office meeting in November, 1993. Willey, who told her story in a 60 Minutes interview, became a target of a White House-directed smear campaign after she went public.
In an interview with Capitol Hill Blue, the retired State Department employee said he believed the story Miss Wellstone, the young English woman who said Clinton raped her in 1969.
''There was no doubt in my mind that this young woman had suffered severe emotional trauma,'' he said. ''But we were under tremendous pressure to avoid the embarrassment of having a Rhodes Scholar charged with rape. I filed a report with my superiors and that was the last I heard of it.''
Miss Wellstone, who is now married and lives near London, confirmed the incident when contacted this week, but refused to discuss the matter further. She said she would not go public with further details of the attack. Afterwards, she changed her phone number and hired a barrister who warned a reporter to stay away from his client.
In his book, Unlimited Access, former FBI agent Gary Aldrich reported that Clinton left Oxford University for a "European Tour" in 1969 and was told by University officials that he was no longer welcome there. Aldrich said Clinton's academic record at Oxford was lackluster. Clinton later accepted a scholarship for Yale Law School and did not complete his studies at Oxford.
The State Department official who investigated the incident said Clinton's interests appeared to be drinking, drugs and sex, not studies.
"I came away from the incident with the clear impression that this was a young man who was there to party, not study," he said.
Oxford officials refused comment. The State Department also refused to comment on the incident. A Freedom of Information request filed by Capitol Hill Blue failed to turn up any records of the incident.
Capitol Hill Blue also spoke with the former Miss James, the Washington fundraiser who confirmed the encounter with Clinton at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, but first said she would not appear publicly because anyone who does so is destroyed by the Clinton White House.
''My husband and children deserve better than that,'' she said when first contacted two weeks ago. After reading the Broaddrick story Friday, however, she called back and gave permission to use her maiden name, but said she had no intention of pursuing the matter.
"I wasn't raped, but I was trapped in a hotel room for a brief moment by a boorish man," she said. "I got away. He tried calling me several times after that, but I didn't take his phone calls. Then he stopped. I guess he moved on."
But Miss James also retreated from public view this week after other news organizations contacted her.
The former Miss Moffet, the legal secretary who says Clinton tried to force her into oral sex in 1979, has since married and left the state. She says that when she told her boyfriend, who was a lawyer and supporter of Clinton, about the incident, he told her to keep her mouth shut.
"He said that people who crossed the governor usually regretted it and that if I knew what was good for me I'd forget that it ever happened," she said. "I haven't forgotten it. You don't forget crude men like that."
Like two other women, the former Miss Moffet declined further interviews. A neighbor said she had received threatening phone calls.
The other encounters were confirmed with more than 30 interviews with retired Arkansas state employees, former state troopers and former Yale and University of Arkansas students. Like others, they refused to go public because of fears of retaliation from the Clinton White House.
Likewise, the mainstream media has shied away from the Broaddrick story. Initially, only The Drudge Report and other Internet news sites have actively pursued it. Since initial publication of this story, a few mainstream media outlets have expressed interest in interviewing the women.
The White House did not return calls for comment. White House attorney David Kendall has issued a public denial of the Broaddrick rape.
Copyright 1999. Capitol Web Publishing
By Daniel J. Harris
& Teresa Hampton
Capitol Hill Blue
Women have been charging Bill Clinton with sexual assault since his days as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford 30 years ago.
A continuing investigation into the President's questionable sexual history reveal incidents that go back as far as Clinton's college days, with more than a dozen women claiming his sexual appetites leave little room for the word ''no.''
Juanita Broaddrick, an Arkansas nursing home operator, told NBC's Lisa Myers five weeks ago she was raped by Clinton. NBC shelved the interview, saying they were confirming all parts of the story, but finally aired it Wednesday night.
Broaddrick finally took her story to The Wall Street Journal, which published her account of the brutal rape at the hands of the future President, followed by The Washington Post and some other publications.
But Capitol Hill Blue has confirmed that Broaddrick's story is only one account of many attempted and actual sexual assaults by Clinton that go back 30 years. Among the other incidents:
Eileen Wellstone, 19-year-old English woman who said Clinton sexually assaulted her after she met him at a pub near the Oxford where the future President was a student in 1969. A retired State Department employee, who asked not to be identified, confirmed that he spoke with the family of the girl and filed a report with his superiors. Clinton admitted having sex with the girl, but claimed it was consensual. The victim's family declined to pursue the case;
In 1972, a 22-year-old woman told campus police at Yale University that she was sexually assaulted by Clinton, a law student at the college. No charges were filed, but retired campus policemen contacted by Capitol Hill Blue confirmed the incident. The woman, tracked down by Capitol Hill Blue last week, confirmed the incident, but declined to discuss it further and would not give permission to use her name;
In 1974, a female student at the University of Arkansas complained that then-law school instructor Bill Clinton tried to prevent her from leaving his office during a conference. She said he groped her and forced his hand inside her blouse. She complained to her faculty advisor who confronted Clinton, but Clinton claimed the student ''came on'' to him. The student left the school shortly after the incident. Reached at her home in Texas, the former student confirmed the incident, but declined to go on the record with her account. Several former students at the University have confirmed the incident in confidential interviews and said there were other reports of Clinton attempting to force himself on female students;
Broaddrick, a volunteer in Clinton's gubernatorial campaign, said he raped her in 1978. Mrs. Broaddrick suffered a bruised and torn lip, which she said she suffered when Clinton bit her during the rape;
From 1978-1980, during Clinton's first term as governor of Arkansas, state troopers assigned to protect the governor were aware of at least seven complaints from women who said Clinton forced, or attempted to force, himself on them sexually. One retired state trooper said in an interview that the common joke among those assigned to protect Clinton was "who's next?". One former state trooper said other troopers would often escort women to the governor's hotel room after political events, often more than one an evening;
Carolyn Moffet, a legal secretary in Little Rock in 1979, said she met then-governor Clinton at a political fundraiser and shortly thereafter received an invitation to meet the governor in his hotel room. "I was escorted there by a state trooper. When I went in, he was sitting on a couch, wearing only an undershirt. He pointed at his penis and told me to suck it. I told him I didn't even do that for my boyfriend and he got mad, grabbed my head and shoved it into his lap. I pulled away from him and ran out of the room."
Elizabeth Ward, the Miss Arkansas who won the Miss America crown in 1982, told friends she was forced by Clinton to have sex with him shortly after she won her state crown. Last year, Ward, who is now married with the last name of Gracen (from her first marriage), told an interviewer she did have sex with Clinton but said it was consensual. Close friends of Ward, however, say she still maintains privately that Clinton forced himself on her.
Paula Corbin, an Arkansas state worker, filed a sexual harassment case against Clinton after an encounter in a Little Rock hotel room where the then-governor exposed himself and demanded oral sex. Clinton settled the case with Jones recently with an $850,000 cash payment.
Sandra Allen James, a former Washington, DC, political fundraiser says Presidential candidate-to-be Clinton invited her to his hotel room during a political trip to the nation's capital in 1991, pinned her against the wall and stuck his hand up her dress. She says she screamed loud enough for the Arkansas State Trooper stationed outside the hotel suite to bang on the door and ask if everything was all right, at which point Clinton released her and she fled the room. When she reported the incident to her boss, he advised her to keep her mouth shut if she wanted to keep working. Miss James has since married and left Washington. Reached at her home last week, the former Miss James said she later learned that other women suffered the same fate at Clinton's hands when he was in Washington during his Presidential run.
Christy Zercher, a flight attendant on Clinton's leased campaign plane in 1992, says Presidential candidate Clinton exposed himself to her, grabbed her breasts and made explicit remarks about oral sex. A video shot on board the plane by ABC News shows an obviously inebriated Clinton with his hand between another young flight attendant's legs. Zercher said later in an interview that White House attorney Bruce Lindsey tried to pressure her into not going public about the assault.
Kathleen Willey, a White House volunteer, reported that Clinton grabbed her, fondled her breast and pressed her hand against his genitals during an Oval Office meeting in November, 1993. Willey, who told her story in a 60 Minutes interview, became a target of a White House-directed smear campaign after she went public.
In an interview with Capitol Hill Blue, the retired State Department employee said he believed the story Miss Wellstone, the young English woman who said Clinton raped her in 1969.
''There was no doubt in my mind that this young woman had suffered severe emotional trauma,'' he said. ''But we were under tremendous pressure to avoid the embarrassment of having a Rhodes Scholar charged with rape. I filed a report with my superiors and that was the last I heard of it.''
Miss Wellstone, who is now married and lives near London, confirmed the incident when contacted this week, but refused to discuss the matter further. She said she would not go public with further details of the attack. Afterwards, she changed her phone number and hired a barrister who warned a reporter to stay away from his client.
In his book, Unlimited Access, former FBI agent Gary Aldrich reported that Clinton left Oxford University for a "European Tour" in 1969 and was told by University officials that he was no longer welcome there. Aldrich said Clinton's academic record at Oxford was lackluster. Clinton later accepted a scholarship for Yale Law School and did not complete his studies at Oxford.
The State Department official who investigated the incident said Clinton's interests appeared to be drinking, drugs and sex, not studies.
"I came away from the incident with the clear impression that this was a young man who was there to party, not study," he said.
Oxford officials refused comment. The State Department also refused to comment on the incident. A Freedom of Information request filed by Capitol Hill Blue failed to turn up any records of the incident.
Capitol Hill Blue also spoke with the former Miss James, the Washington fundraiser who confirmed the encounter with Clinton at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, but first said she would not appear publicly because anyone who does so is destroyed by the Clinton White House.
''My husband and children deserve better than that,'' she said when first contacted two weeks ago. After reading the Broaddrick story Friday, however, she called back and gave permission to use her maiden name, but said she had no intention of pursuing the matter.
"I wasn't raped, but I was trapped in a hotel room for a brief moment by a boorish man," she said. "I got away. He tried calling me several times after that, but I didn't take his phone calls. Then he stopped. I guess he moved on."
But Miss James also retreated from public view this week after other news organizations contacted her.
The former Miss Moffet, the legal secretary who says Clinton tried to force her into oral sex in 1979, has since married and left the state. She says that when she told her boyfriend, who was a lawyer and supporter of Clinton, about the incident, he told her to keep her mouth shut.
"He said that people who crossed the governor usually regretted it and that if I knew what was good for me I'd forget that it ever happened," she said. "I haven't forgotten it. You don't forget crude men like that."
Like two other women, the former Miss Moffet declined further interviews. A neighbor said she had received threatening phone calls.
The other encounters were confirmed with more than 30 interviews with retired Arkansas state employees, former state troopers and former Yale and University of Arkansas students. Like others, they refused to go public because of fears of retaliation from the Clinton White House.
Likewise, the mainstream media has shied away from the Broaddrick story. Initially, only The Drudge Report and other Internet news sites have actively pursued it. Since initial publication of this story, a few mainstream media outlets have expressed interest in interviewing the women.
The White House did not return calls for comment. White House attorney David Kendall has issued a public denial of the Broaddrick rape.
Copyright 1999. Capitol Web Publishing
Friday, October 23, 2015
Henry kissinger and his NWO a compilation of videos and info
Declassified Documents Show Henry Kissinger's Major Role in the 1974 Initiative That Created the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Kissinger Favored Efforts to Curb Nuclear Proliferation in Concert with Other Powers, But Did Not Want U.S. to "Go Charging Around the World, Like Don Quixote"
State Department Advisers Warned That New Nuclear-armed Nations or "Even Subnational Groups" Could "Threaten the United States with Nuclear Violence," Which Would Require "Extensive and Costly Restructuring" of the U.S. Defense Posture
New Documents Disclose the Key Role of Non-NPT Signatory France in Making the NSG Possible But Also in Shaping Guidelines on Lowest Common Denominator Basis
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 467
Posted - April 21, 2014
For more information contact:
William Burr - 202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu
The Origins of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
Drawing upon the documents in this collection and other material is an article on the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the April 2014 issue of International History Review. The article is part of a special issue, "The Origins of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," edited by Roland Popp and Andreas Wenger (ETH Zurich). It includes:
Roland Popp, Introduction
John Krige, "US Technological Superiority and the Special Nuclear Relationship: Contrasting British and US Policies for Controlling the Proliferation of Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment"
Taliana Cuotto, "an International History of the Brazilian-Argentine Rapprochement"
Fabian Hilfrich, " Roots of Animosity: Bonn's Reaction to US Pressures in Nuclear Proliferation"
William Burr, " A Scheme of 'Control': The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, 1974-1976 ."
Dane Swango, "The United States and the Role of Nuclear Co-operation and Assistance in the Design of the Non-Proliferation Treaty."
Washington, D.C., April 21, 2014– Henry Kissinger played a slightly reluctant but nonetheless highly influential role in establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the mid-1970s, motivated equally by concern about nuclear proliferation and a desire to keep U.S. officials from "charging around the world, like Don Quixote," according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project. The newly declassified records also describe France's cooperative role in establishing the NSG, despite French concerns to be seen as pursuing an independent policy on nonproliferation.
During the first months of 1975, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's State Department was working with other allies to organize the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it was difficult to make headway with France, a key nuclear exporter which was reluctant to join the effort to regulate exports of sensitive nuclear technology and materials. The French rejected the comprehensive nuclear safeguards that Washington favored because they "did not want to be accused of acting with nuclear suppliers to gang up on non-NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] parties and even some NPT countries." Reacting to the U.S. proposal to regulate sensitive nuclear exports to unstable countries, French diplomats argued that it was on "dangerous ground" and that imposing such constraints raised "political dangers." Nevertheless, the French had their own concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities and when Kissinger made assurances, they came on board the NSG.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group has played a significant role in the history of the nonproliferation system since the 1970s, although the concerns raised by the French indicate why it was a controversial project very early on. The shock created by the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974 raised questions about the safeguarding of sensitive nuclear technology. With growing competition for sales of nuclear reactors and equipment, U.S. government officials worried about an emerging nuclear proliferation risk that could destabilize international relations and damage U.S. interests. Accordingly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger authorized a secret diplomatic process to create a high-level group that would establish criteria for preventing the diversion of sensitive nuclear technology and materials into nuclear weapons production. Declassified U.S. government documents shed light on the U.S. government role in the creation of the NSG during 1974-1975. The other founding members were governments on both sides of the Cold War line: Canada, France, Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
This summary, excerpted from document 13D, may have been prepared for Secretary Kissinger to give him background and the state-of-play on the discussions with the French on their participation in the suppliers group project. Corresponding French government records on these developments are unavailable. Under France's archive law, as of July 15, 2008, documents relating to nuclear matters were, for all intents and purpose, closed for research indefinitely.
Sometimes known as the "London Club," after the location of its headquarters, the purpose of the NSG has been to fill a gap in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The Treaty stipulated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would provide safeguards for exports of nuclear supplies but it did not create any arrangements for discouraging nuclear exporters from equipping non-nuclear weapons states with sensitive technology. Moreover, NPT Article III covered exports of equipment but did not specify technology as such. Once the NPT had been ratified by many states, large and small, a Swiss academic, Professor Claude Zangger, established a working group of nuclear exporters to develop a trigger list of supplies requiring safeguards. The Zangger Committee, however, did not include technology in its trigger list. That, and France's non-membership — it had refused to sign the NPT — raised diplomatic problems that the administration of President Gerald R. Ford had to resolve.
Among the documents in today's publication:
A "memcon" of Kissinger's conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp after the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974. Canada had sold India the nuclear reactor that helped produce plutonium for the test, but Kissinger said that U.S. safeguards were also "lousy" (Washington had made heavy water available to India)
A memorandum where Kissinger was given the choice of a "low visibility" meeting involving the "most advanced nuclear industrial states" or "a larger, well publicized conference involving numerous other states" He chose the "more restrictive" option, probably to make the meeting more "manageable."
The initial U.S. proposal for nuclear suppliers' guidelines, including "special restraints" over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies and "stringent" conditions where nuclear exports could exacerbate instability and conflict.
Records of U.S.-French bilateral meetings where French officials expressed fears of joining a "cartel" of nuclear "haves," being "isolated" at a suppliers' conference, being "pressured to adopt unacceptable policies," or made to look like a "renegade" on nuclear proliferation issues.
A message to Kissinger expressing concern that news of a loosely safeguarded Brazilian-West German nuclear deal made it urgent to move forward with a suppliers group which included the French, so that such problems could be discussed.
Messages between Kissinger and French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, including Kissinger's commitment that suppliers group agreements would be based on consensus, enabling France to join without fear of group pressures.
Memoranda on the Canadian-French controversy over "full scope safeguards," during which Washington stayed on the sidelines so as not to isolate the French, who opposed full-scope as part of the NPT, which they had refused to sign.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, approved in fall 1975, which called for "restraint" in the transfer of sensitive technologies and regular consultations between suppliers, including over "sensitive cases" to "ensure that transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability, and included a "trigger list" of items that would require safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
An assessment of the 1975 nuclear suppliers' guidelines, in which Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs George Vest wrote that they "served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients," but could not prevent "indigenous" development of nuclear weapons capabilities.
Secretary of State Kissinger meets with French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, over coffee and a plate of croissants, on 5 July 1974. The French government's support was critical to the success of the nuclear suppliers' project. Photo from Still Pictures Branch, National Archives, RG 59-BP, box 36.
Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs George Vest played a key role in the founding of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Photo from Still Pictures Branch, National Archives, RG 59-SO, box 18.
Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Winston Lord, one of Kissinger's close advisers, encouraged support for the suppliers' group and other initiatives to curb nuclear proliferation. Photo from Still Pictures Branch, National Archives, RG 59-SO, box 10.
Convincing France to participate in the suppliers group was a central problem; the French had refused to sign the NPT but were becoming more concerned about the spread of nuclear capabilities. Yet, as noted, they were also concerned about appearances — that governments without a nuclear infrastructure would see the suppliers group as a "cartel" designed to keep them down. Indeed, this became a significant objection to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group over the years. Nevertheless, from the U.S. standpoint, French involvement in the project was crucial because the Japanese and West Germans were unlikely to join without the French. After the French government had assented, the suppliers group began meeting although it would operate on a "lowest common denominator" basis in order to keep France from being "isolated" on key issue such as full-scope safeguards. Pre-existing agreements on sensitive cases (e.g., Brazil-West Germany or Pakistan-France) remained subjects of bilateral discussions.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group started out, and remains, an essentially voluntary international organization. From the outset, its guidelines did not have the force of international law and depended on action by the member states to observe and implement them. Nevertheless, the NSG became an important and enduring institution in the nuclear nonproliferation system, supplementing and supporting both the NPT and the IAEA.[1]
During 1976, the NSG expanded membership to broaden support for its objectives. Nevertheless, in 1978, it stopped meeting because of internal differences over the next steps, such as the role of full-scope safeguards. The guidelines, which became public in 1978 when the IAEA published them, served as a reference tool for nuclear export policies, but Washington pressed the other NSG members to tacitly expand the trigger list by seeking prohibitions of specific dual-use exports bound for nuclear programs in such countries as Pakistan. It was not until the 1990 Gulf War, when the West discovered the extent of Iraq's nuclear program, that a consensus developed for tougher nuclear export controls. In this context, the NSG began meeting again and expanded its membership further. It also adopted full-scope safeguards, but years later granted India an exception that haunts the nonproliferation regime.[2]
That the NSG emerged when it did and in the form it took was due in part to Henry Kissinger's role, not least his success in securing French involvement. Yet, as an NSG founding father, Kissinger barely discusses nonproliferation, much less the Group's creation, in his three volumes of memoirs. With his focus on U.S-Soviet crises and diplomacy, SALT I and II, the wars in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and normalization of relations with China, perhaps he sees the NSG as rather small change. Moreover, Kissinger may have found writing about nonproliferation issues somewhat tricky. He and President Richard Nixon had been dismissive of the NPT, but Kissinger changed course during 1974-1975 and that would have to be explained. Moreover, nonproliferation policy during the 1960s and 1970s cannot be discussed without tackling sensitive questions such as the Israeli nuclear program and why Kissinger had acquiesced in it, in contrast to taking a more activist approach to check Pakistani nuclear plans during 1975-1976. Perhaps, Kissinger concluded that this was one issue that resisted his strong interest in using memoirs and other writings to justify his record of diplomacy.
THE DOCUMENTS
Documents 1A-B: Early Proposals
A: Report, National Security Council Under Secretaries' Committee, "Action Plan for Implementing NSDM 235," 25 March 1974, Secret
B: National Security Decision Memorandum 255, Henry Kissinger to Secretary of Defense et al., " Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries," 3 June 1974, Secret
Sources: A: Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, H-242, NSDM-235 [1 of 2], B: Digital National Security Archive
Before the Indian test, an interagency NSC sub-committee was exploring the problem of safeguards for sensitive nuclear exports. The problem was that an existing group, the Zangger Committee based on NPT membership, did not have a broad enough membership or scope to manage the problem. It had developed a trigger list of nuclear supplies that required IAEA safeguards but the list did not include reprocessing or enrichment technologies because NPT article III only covered supplies, not technology. Toward this end, the Under Secretaries Committee proposed "talks with other suppliers of technology and equipment in the reprocessing and enrichment fields on desirable new constraints or guidelines that should be followed."
One problem that the report brought up was that France did not belong to the Zangger Committee. This raised the possibility that "suppliers may not adhere to the Committee's recommendations if there is serious concern that France will undercut them by selling Trigger List items, without safeguards, to [non-nuclear weapons states] not party to the NPT." The Under Secretaries hoped that France could be persuaded to follow the Zangger Committee's recommendations, but this was a diplomatic problem that would require higher level intervention.
After the Indian test, the agencies moved forward in developing an action plan on the nuclear supply problem and related issues which Henry Kissinger signed off on in NSDM 255. Among other measures, Kissinger endorsed consultations with suppliers to establish "common principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment" and encouraging multinational frameworks for "enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing facilities." Through multinational arrangements, it would be possible to discourage the proliferation of national nuclear enrichment and reprocessing plants.
Document 2: Memorandum of conversation, "Indian Nuclear Explosion; World Food Conference; Pacific Coast Tankers; NATO Declaration; Middle East; Trade Bill," 18 June 1974
Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records, Record Group 59 [RG 59], records of Henry A. Kissinger, 1973-1977 [hereinafter Kissinger records], box 8, June 1974 Nodis Memcons, also on Digital National Security Archive
Canada's safeguards had failed to prevent India from converting spent fuel from the CANDU reactor into plutonium. Kissinger acknowledged to Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp that U.S. safeguards had also proven to be "lousy," failing to prevent India from using U.S.-supplied heavy water for its nuclear activities. Sharp asked Kissinger how the proliferation of nuclear technology could be prevented and what should be said to the Argentines and the Egyptians, who were also seeking to use nuclear energy. But Kissinger evidently had no answer.
Document 3: Transcript, Under Secretary Sisco's Principals' and Regionals' Staff Meeting, Friday, June 21, 1974, 3 p.m., 26 June 1974, Secret, excerpts
Source: RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977, box 4
Also encouraging interest in a close look at nuclear export policy were negotiations, pre-dating the Indian test, over nuclear reactor sales to Israel, Egypt, and Iran. Chairing the meeting in Kissinger's absence, Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco expressed dismay that nuclear nonproliferation had lost high-level support during the Nixon administration.
Document 4: Memorandum of Conversation, "Energy; North Sea Oil; Foreign Assistance; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; CSCE; Trade Bill," 7 July 1974, Secret
Source: RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77 (Helmut Sonnenfeldt), box 4, Britain 1974
Near the end of a discussion of non-proliferation policy with British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan [pages 16-18], Kissinger realized he needed to tackle the problem of nuclear exports and asked his aide, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to arrange a staff meeting.
Document 5: Executive Secretary George S. Springsteen to Secretary of State Kissinger, "Analytical Staff Meeting," 11 July 1974, enclosing "Discussion Paper on U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," Secret
Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Records, Memorandums of the Executive Secretariat, 1964-1975, box 12, S/S Staff Meeting
Prepared by Jerome Kahan and Charles Van Doren, respectively with the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this report provided a comprehensive take on the problem of nuclear proliferation and the state of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Among the specific issues reviewed were the status of the NPT, export control issues, the problem of "peaceful nuclear explosions," the implications of the Indian test, and long-term steps for controlling the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. The authors saw a compelling security requirement: "The basis for our non-proliferation interest is the assessment that the danger of nuclear war as well as world instability would significantly increase with an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons." Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear capabilities would give nations a "'sense of greater independence, thus complicating international diplomacy and diminishing American influence." Finally, new nuclear-armed nations or "even subnational groups" could "threaten the United States with nuclear violence," which would require "extensive and costly restructuring" of the U.S. defense posture.
Creating a forum for nuclear exporters to develop common policies was a major recommendation, but the paper on controls over nuclear exports pointed to a significant problem: "The greatest potential obstacle to effective export controls in the nuclear field has been the lack of cooperation by France." On 12 July Kissinger met with his staff to discuss these issues. No record of the meeting has surfaced, but a few weeks later Policy Planning Staff Director Winston Lord reminded Kissinger: "Last time we agreed in principle that there was something you could do about this problem, it wasn't hopeless" [See document 7].
Document 6: Memorandum to the Secretary of State from ACDA Director Fred Ikle and Policy Planning Staff Director Winston Lord, "Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy," 31 July 1974, Secret
Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977 [hereinafter PPS], box 344, July 1974
To help Kissinger prepare for a follow-up discussion, ACDA and State Department officials prepared a "Non-Proliferation: Strategy and Action Program" to help guide policy. An important proposal was for "high level political approaches to key exporting countries to enlist their support for safeguarding transfers of nuclear materials." While Washington had to approach a number of nuclear exporters, consultations with France "constitute the most crucial and urgent step to be taken." In light of France's status as a significant nuclear supplier but an NPT hold-out, the problem was convincing the French that cooperation was in their interest. They would not want the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to erode their status as a nuclear power, nor would they favor the proliferation of enrichment capabilities that would undermine their own investments in enrichment facilities. Moreover, Washington had leverage as a supplier of HEU to France. This was an "urgent matter."
Document 7: Transcript, "The Secretary's Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation, Friday, August 2, 1974 3:00 p.m," 2 August 1974, Secret
Source: RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977, box 4
Kissinger presided over an important staff meeting in early August where he made a decision to go ahead with the suppliers' project, beginning with approaches to Moscow and Paris. While noting that the U.S., as a sponsor of the NPT, had a "special responsibility" to curb nuclear proliferation, Kissinger did not believe that it had a unique responsibility: "The fact of the matter is that there is no nuclear country whose nuclear capability will threaten us before it threatens fifty other countries." Kissinger observed that he had a "reluctance to have the United States go charging around the world, like Don Quixote, for every conceivable problem … when there are other countries whose interest in it ought to be even greater." Washington had to work with other countries and have them "share some of the responsibility." Nevertheless, "we will still wind up in a leading position." He wanted an approach made to Moscow; further, because of France's importance, "I might want to talk quietly to the French and tell them what is coming. And if they have an overwhelming desire for preliminary bilateral talks with us, maybe we will do it." He wanted to "think through how to do this."
Document 8: Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Fred Ikle and Winston Lord, "U.S. Policy on Nuclear Proliferation," 26 August 1974, with 29 November 1974 cover memorandum, Secret
Source: PPS, box 348, Nov. 1974
While U.S. nonproliferation strategy focused on several problems, such as ratification of the NPT by key countries, interest in a conference of major nuclear suppliers solidified. According to Kissinger's advisers, "A conference of nuclear industrial states offers an opportunity for realizing a coordinated approach in placing effective controls, including safeguards and security measures, over transfers of commercial nuclear equipment and materials." When given the choice of a "low visibility" meeting involving the "most advanced nuclear industrial states," and a larger, well publicized conference involving numerous other states, Kissinger chose the "more restrictive" option, probably to "enhance both the manageability of the conference and the prospects for reaching consensus among the current major suppliers."
Documents 9A-C: Bringing the Soviets In
A: Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Lord and Ikle, "Consultations with the Soviets on Non-Proliferation Strategy,"18 September 1974, Secret
B: Memorandum to the Secretary of State from "Talks on Reactor Safeguards and Related Matters with the Soviets on October 15," 5 October 1974
C: State Department telegram 228213 to U.S. Embassy Moscow, "Nuclear Safeguards Consultations," 17 October 1974
Sources: A: State Department release from P-reels; B: PPS, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-China; C: National Archives Access to Archival Databases On-line collections, State Department telegrams for 1974 and other years (hereafter AAD)
The Soviet Union was not yet a major nuclear exporter, but they had potential and as a major co-sponsor of the NPT had followed nonproliferation norms in their nuclear dealings. Kissinger and his advisers took it for granted that Moscow should be involved in a suppliers' project at the outset although they were not sure how the Soviets would react to being the only Communist state in a group of U.S. allies. Washington could lessen this problem by assuring Moscow that the initial group would be the "nucleus" of a larger grouping that could include Soviet allies.
Once Kissinger approved an approach, State Department officials prepared the substance of communications with Moscow, which included a basic five-point paper (See document 9B, Tab B) constituting proposed "undertakings" for a suppliers' group. The proposed guidelines for nuclear exporters included no "peaceful nuclear explosives" for non-nuclear states, IAEA safeguards for nuclear supplies, and "special restraints" over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including comprehensive safeguards and multinational plants. Moreover, for regions where nuclear exports could exacerbate instability and conflict, suppliers would agree to "stringent" conditions. On 17 October 1974, the State Department took the first step to bringing the Soviets in by sending a telegram about the project to the embassy in Moscow.
Document 10: Memorandum from Winston Lord, Fred Iklé, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt to the Secretary, "Follow-up with French on Nuclear Export Controls,"17 October 1974, Secret
Source: PPS, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-China
With an approach to the Soviets already in the works, Kissinger's top advisers emphasized the importance of a parallel approach to the French, given their centrality to the prospects for a suppliers' group. While no one could be sure whether the French would abandon their "case-by-case" approach to nuclear exports, the advisers believed that the French disliked nuclear proliferation and wished to remain the only nuclear weapons state in Western Europe. Moreover, their dependency on U.S. HEU for their civilian nuclear program might reinforce their interest in strengthening U.S.-French relations. By mid-October 1974, the French were giving signals that they were open to dialogue on export controls but the advisers believed that an approach to Paris was becoming more urgent in light of recent intelligence that Paris was signing contracts on nuclear export deals, probably a reference to Pakistan and South Korea.
Document 11: Memorandum from Williams H. Luers, Executive Secretariat, to Winston Lord and Fred Iklé, 22 October 1974, with two memoranda to Kissinger attached, Secret
Source: PPS, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-China
Kissinger agreed that in his absence Acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll and ACDA Director Fred Iklé should meet with French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet and that the British, Germans, and Canadians should receive copies of the five-point paper, and also be informed of the approaches to the French and the Soviets.
Document 12: George H. Springsteen, Jr., Executive Secretary, to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, "Briefing Paper on Non-Proliferation," 21 December 1974, Secret
Source: State Department release from P-reels
In the course of a background paper on the nuclear proliferation problem and policy options, the State Department updated the White House on the state of play of the nuclear suppliers' initiative: the British, the Canadians, and the Soviets had agreed to attend a meeting; the Germans would agree "if all key suppliers" (France) accepted; and the Japanese, who had also been asked, had not responded. The French had not given an answer and bilateral discussions would take place to go over the issues.
Documents 13A-E: Bringing the French In
A: Memorandum to the Deputy Secretary from Winston Lord, "Next Steps for the Nuclear Suppliers' Conference," 16 January 1975, with memoranda attached, secret
B: Memorandum of conversation, "French Participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Conference," [Distribution List Attached], 24 February 1975
C: State Department telegram 65502 to U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, "Action Memorandum: Nuclear Suppliers' Conference," 23 March 1975
D: State Department memorandum, "Nuclear Suppliers Conference/French Participation,"26 March 1975, Secret, with background papers attached, Secret
E: Memorandum from George S. Vest, Bureau of European Affairs, to Secretary of State, "French Foreign Minister's Response on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 9 April 1975, with background papers attached, Secret
F: State Department telegram 90533 to U.S. Embassy Paris, "Exploratory Meeting of Nuclear Suppliers,"19 April 1975, Secret
Source: A: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-China, B-D: : State Department releases from P-reels; E: AAD
Some months of secret talks were required for Kissinger and his advisers to persuade the French government to attend the preliminary suppliers' meeting in London in April 1975. Not knowing that French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing had become more worried about nuclear proliferation and more interested in trying to curb it, U,S. officials were pleased to learn that the French had moved "closer … to responsible behavior" on nuclear exports. President Ford began the process by asking d'Estaing, during the Martinique summit in December 1974, to approve French participation in a suppliers' group. While the French were generally receptive because they did not want to be "isolated," they nevertheless wanted to chart their own course in developing nonproliferation policy.
It took some wrangling over a variety of issues, including the five U.S. points, which the French did not fully accept, to get them involved in a suppliers' project. After French officials observed that what would emerge would "be the least common denominator," State Department Politico-Military Affairs Director George Vest acknowledged that was "the nature of such activities." Compromises or not, Vest and his colleagues wanted to move forward. Adding urgency to getting the French involved was growing U.S. concern that West German safeguards for the sale of nuclear technology to Brazil were too loose. If the French did not participate, neither would the West Germans. To ensure French involvement, Kissinger wrote Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues that he saw enough "common understanding" on important issues to provide a basis for French participation. He assured Sauvagnargues that he did not want any of the "major suppliers to be isolated" and that there was a need for consensus and" harmonization" on policy.
In reply the French foreign minister asked for assurances and recognition that French concessions were the "limits of our possibilities." For example, agreement should be by consensus, no decisions would be retroactive (that is, not apply to contracts that the French had already signed), and meetings should be confidential. On 18 April, Kissinger met with the French ambassador and provided the necessary assurances, which he wrote up in a letter to Sauvagnargues not long before the suppliers met in London on 25 April. Kissinger shaped the future of the NSG by writing that agreements would be based on consensus, decisions would not be retroactive, and the suppliers meetings would be "informal and confidential." This arrangement assured that the suppliers' group would operate on a lowest-common-denominator basis, but there was no choice because French participation was vital.
Documents 14 A-D: The April Meeting and Its Consequences
A: Briefing Paper, "The Nuclear Suppliers Conference," circa June 1975
B: Memorandum from Thomas O. Enders to the Secretary, "Draft Letter to Sauvagnargues," 14 June 1975, Secret
C: U.S. Embassy London telegram 9376 to State Department, "Nuclear Export Policy: Bilaterals with FRG," 19 June 1975, Secret
D: Briefing Paper prepared for the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, "Status Summary of Nuclear Suppliers Conference and Relevant Bilateral Discussion", July 1975, Secret
Sources: A: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, Reports, and Minutes, box 217A, State Visit of President Scheel June 1975; b: PPS, box 356, June 1-15, 1975, C: AAD. D: FOIA release
State Department records of the April meeting in London have yet to surface in the archives, but the gist of what happened can be parsed out from other documents. So can the results of a follow-up meeting in mid-June 1975. The U.S. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would take into account French and other views so as to reach agreement on the most "stringent" safeguards possible. A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as "full-scope" safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country. On these matters and others, the French position was central.
Documents 15A-E: The Struggle over Full Scope Safeguards
A: Memorandum from George S. Vest to Secretary of State, "September 14-17 Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting. " 23 September 1975, Secret, excised copy, under appeal
B: U.S. Embassy London telegram 14177 to State Department, "French-U.S. Consultations on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 15 September 1975
C: George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, "British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference," 10 October 1975, Confidential
D: Briefing Paper, "Nuclear Suppliers Conference," circa 15 October 1975 Secretary's Trip to Ottawa, 14-15 October 1975
E: Memorandum of conversation, "Visit of Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger to Canada; Luncheon at 24 Sussex Drive," 15 October 1975, Secret
Sources: A and E: State Department release from P-reels; B: Declassification release from AAD; C: RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-1977, box 7, FSE 3 Nuclear Suppliers Conference; D: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, Reports, and Minutes, box 223, Secretary's Trip to Ottawa, 14-15 October 1975
[Note: Drawing on the declassified record, the editor has filled in many of the country names deleted by State Department reviewers from document A.]
The September 1975 meeting of the suppliers' group brought out a conflict over a decisive issue, whether supplying countries should require recipient countries to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards or require them only for the technology and supplies at issue in the contract ("project safeguards"). The Canadians strongly supported the former, "full scope safeguards" (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as "tantamount to imposing NPT obligations" — a reference to the Treaty's Article III — which they would not accept. Washington had included the substance of full-scope safeguards in the original five-point paper but Kissinger would not go against the French and risk the hard-won understanding that had brought them into the group. A recently declassified telegram (document 15B) illuminates the U.S. -French dialogue over safeguards and other provisions in the nuclear suppliers' guidance. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was "alien to [their] philosophy," the French suggested that a "traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities)," would make it possible to achieve "the practical equivalent" of the Canadian proposal.
Ottawa relented but an interesting and sometimes confused conversation between Kissinger and Prime Minister Pierre-Elliot Trudeau suggested the latter was still interested in full-scope safeguards. Kissinger might not have been sure what Trudeau meant: "an effort must be made," he said, even though Washington was not supporting Ottawa on this point. Trudeau highlighted an important problem: the "role of crass business interests" which see the proliferation problem as "insoluble" and therefore press to "go ahead on a business basis."
Document 16A-B: Final Agreement on Guidelines
A: Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, "Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines," 31 December 1975, Secret
B: George Vest to the Secretary, "Nuclear Suppliers Status Report," 25 January 1976, Secret
Sources: A: State Department release from P-reels, B: RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77, box 7, Nuclear Suppliers Conference
The first part of document 16A comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers' meeting. That event led to another meeting in early November where the parties hammered out a set of guidelines — marching orders for the suppliers' future decisions. The British tried to work out a compromise on full-scope safeguards, but that proved acceptable to none; the best that could be achieved was French agreement to future consideration of full-scope. Another contested issue was a U.S. proposal for mandatory supplier involvement in enrichment and reprocessing facilities, but that met strong opposition and was made nonbinding.
At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. The final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger, "served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients." It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent "indigenous" development of nuclear capabilities and "unsafeguarded developments" or the acquisition of sensitive technology.
The guidelines did not constitute an international agreement but a set of "common policies" that each government would implement accordingly. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Moreover, suppliers would conduct regular consultations over "sensitive cases" to "ensure that transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability."
Appended to the guidelines was a two-page "trigger list" based on the Zangger Committee's list, with detailed explanations of items requiring safeguards, from fissile materials to nuclear reactors to "non-nuclear materials for reactors," such as heavy water, deuterium, and enrichment and reprocessing technology/equipment. The latter included, for example, gas centrifuge technology and "know-how" needed to operate a gas centrifuge plant.
Not included in the trigger list was dual-use equipment and technology. This problem was understood at the time and it surfaced with a vengeance during 1978-79 when British officials discovered the A. Q. Khan network's attempts to purchase inverters needed to operate gas centrifuge enrichment machines.
Documents 17A-D: Developments during 1976-1977
A: George Vest to the Secretary, "London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 11 June 1976, Confidential
B: London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, "London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting, November 11 - 12," 12 November 1976, Confidential
C: State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., "Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977," 3 May 1977, Confidential
D: State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, "Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 15 September 1977, Confidential
E: State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., "Nuclear Suppliers Meeting - Assessment," 23 September 1977, Confidential
Sources: A : RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77, box 7, Nuclear Suppliers Conference, B and C: State State Department and Defense Department FOIA releases respectively; D and F: AAD
To develop broader support for the NSG's mission, the original members expanded their numbers in 1976 to include more Western and Soviet bloc countries as well as one Cold War neutral. The new members were Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a "long term and stable regime of restraint" on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the West Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.
With the Carter administration in power in 1977, nuclear nonproliferation policy had greater precedence than under Ford and, reversing the approach that Kissinger had taken, U.S. diplomats lobbied for NSG endorsement of full-scope safeguards. While full-scope had wide support in the group, both the French and the West Germans remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated' in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had "fully achieved" its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group's future was plainly uncertain.
At the September 1977 meeting, the NSG agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full-scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a "secret cartel." In February 1978, soon after the IAEA had received the guidelines, it made them a public record matter.
Thursday, October 22, 2015
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
Monday, October 19, 2015
edward bernays book Propaganda
link below
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Bernays_Propaganda_in_english_.pdf
https://youtu.be/X1G9nCFgRfw
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Bernays_Propaganda_in_english_.pdf
https://youtu.be/X1G9nCFgRfw
memorandum 200 kissinger is concerned of growing population worldwide and seeks solution
http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_200.pdf
Sunday, October 18, 2015
ex cia analyst accused of possessing child porn after writing a book on cia involvement in the drug trade!
John F. Abbotsford, a 38-year old Afghan war veteran, that has also served his country as a CIA analyst, has recently been convicted of possession of child pornography, accusations he claims “have been made up” by the US government to stop the publication of his upcoming book, the CIA in Afghanistan: 30 years of drug smuggling.
“This is a desperate attempt by the US government to shut me up” he said in court. “If I’m going to face jail time, I want the truth to be known before they try to get rid of me in prison” he told the judge. “I’m not scared of their threats, whatever happens, I will never shut up” he cried out in the courtroom.
ciajail
The former Army intelligence officer, Afghan war veteran, and recipient of the Combat Action Badge, Purple Heart, and the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, has been sentenced yesterday to nine months in jail followed by three years of probation
During the court session, the retired CIA operative refused to answer all questions concerning the child pornography possession charges and kept talking about alleged CIA drug smuggling related events in Afghanistan.
“I’m ashamed to say that I have participated in these drug smuggling operations on many occasions. For a long time, I tried to convince myself that we were doing it for the right cause, but this burden is destroying me inside and I just can’t stand it anymore” he admitted before the court audience.
“The CIA has been dealing drugs since its creation. They’ve been smuggling drugs everywhere in the world for the past 60 years, in Taiwan in 1949 to support General Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese commies, in Vietnam, in Nicaragua, and that’s just the tip of the iceberg” he launched out during the court trial. “We helped the Mujahideen develop poppy cultivation to fight the Soviets, but we took back matters in our own hands in 2001 when we invaded Afghanistan under Bush” he pleaded.
9/11: A pretext to invade Afghanistan
The Cheyenne Herald also reports that the man’s website, that was shut down by family members hours after the conviction, claimed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks where in fact staged by his own government and a “pretext” to invade Afghanistan.
He also believed that the Islamic State is presently financed by the CIA’s alleged heroin smuggling operations with the purpose of “destabilizing governments of the Middle East” and “toppling non-US allied country leaders, such as Bachar Al-Assad in Syria” to “secure beneficial oil deals for the US and allied countries”.
In 2010, Abbotsford, 33, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and a year later he received a medical discharge.
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Afghanistan CIA Heroin veteran
“This is a desperate attempt by the US government to shut me up” he said in court. “If I’m going to face jail time, I want the truth to be known before they try to get rid of me in prison” he told the judge. “I’m not scared of their threats, whatever happens, I will never shut up” he cried out in the courtroom.
ciajail
The former Army intelligence officer, Afghan war veteran, and recipient of the Combat Action Badge, Purple Heart, and the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, has been sentenced yesterday to nine months in jail followed by three years of probation
During the court session, the retired CIA operative refused to answer all questions concerning the child pornography possession charges and kept talking about alleged CIA drug smuggling related events in Afghanistan.
“I’m ashamed to say that I have participated in these drug smuggling operations on many occasions. For a long time, I tried to convince myself that we were doing it for the right cause, but this burden is destroying me inside and I just can’t stand it anymore” he admitted before the court audience.
“The CIA has been dealing drugs since its creation. They’ve been smuggling drugs everywhere in the world for the past 60 years, in Taiwan in 1949 to support General Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese commies, in Vietnam, in Nicaragua, and that’s just the tip of the iceberg” he launched out during the court trial. “We helped the Mujahideen develop poppy cultivation to fight the Soviets, but we took back matters in our own hands in 2001 when we invaded Afghanistan under Bush” he pleaded.
9/11: A pretext to invade Afghanistan
The Cheyenne Herald also reports that the man’s website, that was shut down by family members hours after the conviction, claimed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks where in fact staged by his own government and a “pretext” to invade Afghanistan.
He also believed that the Islamic State is presently financed by the CIA’s alleged heroin smuggling operations with the purpose of “destabilizing governments of the Middle East” and “toppling non-US allied country leaders, such as Bachar Al-Assad in Syria” to “secure beneficial oil deals for the US and allied countries”.
In 2010, Abbotsford, 33, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and a year later he received a medical discharge.
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Afghanistan CIA Heroin veteran
understanding the current syrian conflict!
Syria is a giant proxy mess
Syria's war: A 5-minute historyTo understand the bloody, convoluted war happening inside and outside of Syria's borders, you need to watch this:
Posted by Ezra Klein on Wednesday, October 14, 2015
new opium poppy seeds double opium production in afghanistan! gmo papaver somniferum?
ZHARI, Afghanistan (AP) — It's the cash crop of the Taliban and the scourge of Afghanistan — the country's intractable opium cultivation. This year, many Afghan poppy farmers are expecting a windfall as they get ready to harvest opium from a new variety of poppy seeds said to boost yield of the resin that produces heroin.
The plants grow bigger, faster, use less water than seeds they've used before, and give up to double the amount of opium, they say.
No one seems to know where the seeds originate from. The farmers of Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where most of Afghanistan's poppies are grown, say they were hand-delivered for planting early this year by the same men who collect the opium after each harvest, and who also provide them with tools, fertilizer, farming advice — and the much needed cash advance.
To the villagers, the shadowy men are intermediaries for drug lords and regional traffickers working with or for the Taliban, underscoring the extensive web that fuels the opium trade and keeps the poppy farmers in a clasp of terror and dependency. The impoverished famers have little recourse but to accept the seeds and other farming materials on credit, to be paid back when they harvest the crop, continuing a never ending cycle of debt.
Afghanistan's poppy harvest, which accounts for most of the world's heroin, is worth an estimated $3 billion a year, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Production hit a record high in 2014, up 17 percent compared to the year before, as opium and the drugs trade continued to undermine security, rule of law and development, while funding both organized crime and the Taliban — often one and the same.
The trend is expected to continue in 2015, in part thanks to the new poppy seeds, according to officials tasked with overseeing the eradication of poppy crops.
This upcoming harvest in late spring is expected to surpass last year's country-wide record of 7,800 metric tons (8,600 U.S. tons) by as much as 7 percent and 22 percent in Kandahar and Helmand provinces respectively, local officials said.
Experts say the Taliban, who have been waging war on the Kabul government for more than a decade, derive around 40 percent of their funding from opium, which in turn fuels their insurgency.
Fierce fighting in recent months in poppy-growing regions shows the Taliban's determination to protect their trafficking routes and the seasonal workers who come to earn money at harvest time from government forces under orders to eradicate the crop.
Gul Mohammad Shukran, chief of Kandahar's anti-narcotics department, said the new seeds came with the drug traffickers, but he did not know exactly where from. They yield "better drug plants, which require less water and have a faster growth time."
"This is a big threat to everyone," he said, adding that Afghanistan's central authorities had failed to act on his warnings.
Growing poppy for opium is illegal in Afghanistan and forbidden under Islam, the country's predominant religion. But Afghan farmers feel they have no choice. For more than a decade the government and its international partners have pleaded with them to grow something else — wheat, fruit or even saffron.
When that didn't work, the police were sent to destroy crops. And when that failed, the Americans and the British tried handing out free wheat seeds, an enterprise that found little fertile ground.
This spring, the opium fields have again erupted in a sea of bright pink poppy flowers.
The new poppy seeds allow farmers to almost double the output from each plant, said Helmand's provincial police chief Nabi Jan Malakhail. At harvest, collectors cut the bulb of the plant, allowing the raw opium to ooze out. This resin dries and is collected the following day.
Malakhail said the new seeds grow bulbs that are bigger than usual and can be scored twice within a few days, thus doubling the quantity of raw opium. The plants mature in three to four months, rather than the five months of the previous seed variety, allowing farmers to crop three times a year instead of just twice.
In Kandahar's Zhari district, farmer Abdul Baqi said he knows poppy growing is illegal and that, given a choice, he would "rather eat grass." But, he added, "I cannot feed my kids with nothing but the air."
Baqi said the Taliban and associated crime gangs make it easy for the farmers to produce opium, and difficult — even deadly — not to.
Without government support, it's impossible to grow food crops as the cash-strapped farmers would have to pay for the seeds, tools, fertilizer and irrigation themselves. No one would come and collect their crop, even if their landlords allowed them to grow wheat or other food.
If the government took charge and provided irrigation and power, Hismatullah Janan, another Zhari poppy grower, said he would gladly change to growing wheat or similar crops "so we could make an honest and decent living, and leave this so-called dirty work behind."
Afghan anti-narcotics officials say they need international assistance to proceed with poppy eradication.
Yet since 2002, the United States has spent at least $7 billion "on a wide variety of programs to reduce poppy cultivation, prevent narcotics production, treat drug addiction and improve the criminal justice system to combat drug trafficking," John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, told the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in January.
Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the world's opium and opiates originating from there find their way to every corner of the globe, Sopko said.
The Taliban will also likely be emboldened, since for the first time this year, there are no international combat troops on the battlefields of Afghanistan after the NATO drawdown at the end of 2014.
Many anti-narcotics officials also left, fuelling concerns that Afghanistan's economic addiction to opium, worth around 15 percent of its gross domestic product, would only grow, Sopko added.
Almost 90 percent of Afghanistan's poppy cultivation is in the south and the west — and provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar, longtime Taliban strongholds, have become synonymous for poppy cultivation.
As opium production rises, so does Afghanistan's own drug addiction problem. Estimates put the number of heroin addicts in the country at between 1.5 million and 2 million in a population estimated at around 30 million. And the unchecked Afghan opium production is also blamed for rising drug addiction in neighboring countries, including the former Soviet republics to the north, Iran to the west, and China and Pakistan to the east.
The UNODC can do little beyond encouraging the government to curb opium production, said the organization's chief in Afghanistan, Andrey Avetisyan.
Kabul, with the support from the international community, he said, needs to find a way to introduce "crops that can be a serious competition to opium."
But for now, finding something more lucrative than the mystery poppy seeds is a daunting task, so the vicious opium cycle continues.
___
Lynne O'Donnell reported from Kabul, Afghanistan.
Follow Lynne O'Donnell on Twitter at https://twitter.com/lynnekodonnell
The plants grow bigger, faster, use less water than seeds they've used before, and give up to double the amount of opium, they say.
No one seems to know where the seeds originate from. The farmers of Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where most of Afghanistan's poppies are grown, say they were hand-delivered for planting early this year by the same men who collect the opium after each harvest, and who also provide them with tools, fertilizer, farming advice — and the much needed cash advance.
To the villagers, the shadowy men are intermediaries for drug lords and regional traffickers working with or for the Taliban, underscoring the extensive web that fuels the opium trade and keeps the poppy farmers in a clasp of terror and dependency. The impoverished famers have little recourse but to accept the seeds and other farming materials on credit, to be paid back when they harvest the crop, continuing a never ending cycle of debt.
Afghanistan's poppy harvest, which accounts for most of the world's heroin, is worth an estimated $3 billion a year, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Production hit a record high in 2014, up 17 percent compared to the year before, as opium and the drugs trade continued to undermine security, rule of law and development, while funding both organized crime and the Taliban — often one and the same.
The trend is expected to continue in 2015, in part thanks to the new poppy seeds, according to officials tasked with overseeing the eradication of poppy crops.
This upcoming harvest in late spring is expected to surpass last year's country-wide record of 7,800 metric tons (8,600 U.S. tons) by as much as 7 percent and 22 percent in Kandahar and Helmand provinces respectively, local officials said.
Experts say the Taliban, who have been waging war on the Kabul government for more than a decade, derive around 40 percent of their funding from opium, which in turn fuels their insurgency.
Fierce fighting in recent months in poppy-growing regions shows the Taliban's determination to protect their trafficking routes and the seasonal workers who come to earn money at harvest time from government forces under orders to eradicate the crop.
Gul Mohammad Shukran, chief of Kandahar's anti-narcotics department, said the new seeds came with the drug traffickers, but he did not know exactly where from. They yield "better drug plants, which require less water and have a faster growth time."
"This is a big threat to everyone," he said, adding that Afghanistan's central authorities had failed to act on his warnings.
Growing poppy for opium is illegal in Afghanistan and forbidden under Islam, the country's predominant religion. But Afghan farmers feel they have no choice. For more than a decade the government and its international partners have pleaded with them to grow something else — wheat, fruit or even saffron.
When that didn't work, the police were sent to destroy crops. And when that failed, the Americans and the British tried handing out free wheat seeds, an enterprise that found little fertile ground.
This spring, the opium fields have again erupted in a sea of bright pink poppy flowers.
The new poppy seeds allow farmers to almost double the output from each plant, said Helmand's provincial police chief Nabi Jan Malakhail. At harvest, collectors cut the bulb of the plant, allowing the raw opium to ooze out. This resin dries and is collected the following day.
Malakhail said the new seeds grow bulbs that are bigger than usual and can be scored twice within a few days, thus doubling the quantity of raw opium. The plants mature in three to four months, rather than the five months of the previous seed variety, allowing farmers to crop three times a year instead of just twice.
In Kandahar's Zhari district, farmer Abdul Baqi said he knows poppy growing is illegal and that, given a choice, he would "rather eat grass." But, he added, "I cannot feed my kids with nothing but the air."
Baqi said the Taliban and associated crime gangs make it easy for the farmers to produce opium, and difficult — even deadly — not to.
Without government support, it's impossible to grow food crops as the cash-strapped farmers would have to pay for the seeds, tools, fertilizer and irrigation themselves. No one would come and collect their crop, even if their landlords allowed them to grow wheat or other food.
If the government took charge and provided irrigation and power, Hismatullah Janan, another Zhari poppy grower, said he would gladly change to growing wheat or similar crops "so we could make an honest and decent living, and leave this so-called dirty work behind."
Afghan anti-narcotics officials say they need international assistance to proceed with poppy eradication.
Yet since 2002, the United States has spent at least $7 billion "on a wide variety of programs to reduce poppy cultivation, prevent narcotics production, treat drug addiction and improve the criminal justice system to combat drug trafficking," John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, told the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in January.
Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the world's opium and opiates originating from there find their way to every corner of the globe, Sopko said.
The Taliban will also likely be emboldened, since for the first time this year, there are no international combat troops on the battlefields of Afghanistan after the NATO drawdown at the end of 2014.
Many anti-narcotics officials also left, fuelling concerns that Afghanistan's economic addiction to opium, worth around 15 percent of its gross domestic product, would only grow, Sopko added.
Almost 90 percent of Afghanistan's poppy cultivation is in the south and the west — and provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar, longtime Taliban strongholds, have become synonymous for poppy cultivation.
As opium production rises, so does Afghanistan's own drug addiction problem. Estimates put the number of heroin addicts in the country at between 1.5 million and 2 million in a population estimated at around 30 million. And the unchecked Afghan opium production is also blamed for rising drug addiction in neighboring countries, including the former Soviet republics to the north, Iran to the west, and China and Pakistan to the east.
The UNODC can do little beyond encouraging the government to curb opium production, said the organization's chief in Afghanistan, Andrey Avetisyan.
Kabul, with the support from the international community, he said, needs to find a way to introduce "crops that can be a serious competition to opium."
But for now, finding something more lucrative than the mystery poppy seeds is a daunting task, so the vicious opium cycle continues.
___
Lynne O'Donnell reported from Kabul, Afghanistan.
Follow Lynne O'Donnell on Twitter at https://twitter.com/lynnekodonnell
Wednesday, October 14, 2015
Hillary Clinton guilty of insider trading! expert says odds of 100 fold profit from cattle futures at that time is1 in 31 trillion
Hillary Rodham cattle futures controversy
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In 1978 and 1979, lawyer and First Lady of Arkansas Hillary Rodham engaged in a series of trades of cattle futures contracts. Her initial $1,000 investment had generated nearly $100,000 when she stopped trading after ten months. In 1994, after Hillary Rodham Clinton had become First Lady of the United States, the trading became the subject of considerable controversy regarding the likelihood of such a spectacular rate of return, possible conflict of interest, and allegations of disguised bribery,[1] allegations that Clinton strongly denied. There were no official investigations of the trading and Clinton was never charged with any wrongdoing.
Contents [hide]
1 Trades and first exposure
2 Likelihood of results
3 Merc and Melamed investigations
4 Clinton responses
5 Official findings
6 References
Trades and first exposure[edit]
Hillary Rodham and Bill Clinton lived in this 980 square feet (91 m2) house in the Hillcrest neighborhood of Little Rock from 1977 to 1979 while he was Arkansas Attorney General.[2] The couple's modest circumstances led Rodham to seek investment income.
Rodham had no experience in such financial instruments. Bill Clinton's salary as Arkansas Attorney General and then Governor of Arkansas was modest and Rodham said she was interested in building a financial cushion for the future[3][4] (the ill-fated Whitewater Development Corporation would be another such effort from this time[3]). Starting in October 1978, when Bill Clinton was Attorney General and on the verge of being elected Governor,[1] she was guided by James Blair, a friend, lawyer, outside counsel to Tyson Foods, Arkansas's largest employer, and, since 1977,[5] a futures trader who was doing so well he encouraged friends and family to enter the commodity markets as well.[3][4] Blair in turn traded through, and relied upon cattle markets expertise from, broker Robert L. "Red" Bone of Refco, a former Tyson executive and professional poker player who was a World Series of Poker semifinalist.[6][4]
Rodham later wrote that she educated herself about the market and followed it closely, winning and losing money.[3] By January 1979, she was up $26,000;[4] but later, she would lose $16,000 in a single trade.[4] At one point she owed in excess of $100,000 to Refco as part of covering losses, but no margin calls were made by Refco against her.[4] Near the end of the trading, Blair correctly sold short and gave her a $40,000 gain in one afternoon.[4] In July 1979,[1] once she became pregnant with Chelsea Clinton, "I lost my nerve for gambling [and] walked away from the table $100,000 ahead."[3] She briefly traded sugar futures contracts and other non-cattle commodities in October 1979, but more conservatively, through Stephens Inc.[4][7] During this period she made about $6,500 in gains (which she failed to pay taxes on at the time, consequently later paying some $14,600 in federal and state tax penalties in the 1990s).[8][7] Once her daughter was born in February 1980, she moved all her commodities gains into U.S. Treasury Bonds.[4]
The profits made during the cattle trading first came to public light in a March 18, 1994 report by The New York Times, which had been reviewing the Clintons' financial records for two months.[6] It immediately gained considerable press attention, and coincided with the beginning of congressional hearings over the Whitewater controversy.[9] Media pressure continued to build, and on April 22, 1994, Hillary Clinton gave an unusual press conference under a portrait of Abraham Lincoln in the State Dining Room of the White House, to address questions on both matters; it was broadcast live by CBS, NBC, ABC, and CNN.[10] In it she said she had done the trading, but often relying upon the advice of Blair, and having him place orders for her; she said she did not believe she had received preferential treatment in the process.[10] She also downplayed the dangers of such trading: "I didn't think it was that big a risk. [Blair] and the people he was talking with knew what they were doing."[5] Afterwards she won media praise for the manner in which she conducted herself during this, her first adversarial press conference;[10] Time called her "open, candid, but above all unflappable ... the real message was her attitude and her poise. The confiding tone and relaxed body language ... immediately drew approving reviews."[11]
Likelihood of results[edit]
Various publications sought to analyze the likelihood of Rodham's successful results. The editor of the Journal of Futures Markets said in April 1994, "This is like buying ice skates one day and entering the Olympics a day later. She took some extraordinary risks."[12] USA Today concluded in April 1994 after a four-week study that "Hillary Rodham Clinton had some special treatment while winning a small fortune in commodities."[7] According to The Washington Post's May 1994 analysis, "while Clinton's account was wildly successful to an outsider, it was small compared to what others were making in the cattle futures market in the 1978–79 period." However, the Post's comparison was of absolute profits, not necessarily percentage rate of return.[13] In a Fall 1994 paper for the Journal of Economics and Finance, economists from the University of North Florida and Auburn University investigated the odds of gaining a hundred-fold return in the cattle futures market during the period in question. Using a model that was stated to give the hypothetical investor the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the odds of such a return happening were at best 1 in 31 trillion.[14]
Financial writer Edward Chancellor noted in 1999 that Clinton made her money by betting "on the short side at a time when cattle prices doubled."[15] Bloomberg News columnist Caroline Baum and hedge fund manager Victor Niederhoffer published a detailed 1995 analysis in National Review that found typical patterns and behaviors in commodities trading not met and concluded that her explanations for her results were highly implausible.[16] Possibilities were raised that broker actions such as front running of trades, or a long straddle with the winning positions thereof assigned to a favored client, had taken place.[13][16]
In a 1998 article, Marshall Magazine, a publication of the Marshall School of Business, sought to frame the trading, the nature of the results, and possible explanations for them:
These results are quite remarkable. Two-thirds of her trades showed a profit by the end of the day she made them and 80 percent were ultimately profitable. Many of her trades took place at or near the best prices of the day.
Only four explanations can account for these remarkable results. Blair may have been an exceptionally good trader. Hillary Clinton may have been exceptionally lucky. Blair may have been front-running other orders. Or Blair may have arranged to have a broker fraudulently assign trades to benefit Clinton's account.[17]
Merc and Melamed investigations[edit]
Chicago Mercantile Exchange records indicated that $40,000 of her profits came from larger trades initiated by James Blair. According to exchange records, "Red" Bone, the commodities broker that facilitated the trades on behalf of Refco, reportedly because Blair was a good client, allowed Rodham to maintain her positions even though she did not have enough money in her account to cover her activity. For example, she was allowed to order 10 cattle futures contracts, normally a $12,000 investment, in her first commodity trade in 1978 although she had only $1,000 in her account at the time.[13] Bone denied any wrongdoing in conjunction with Rodham's trading and said he did not recall ever dealing with Rodham personally.[7][12]
As it happened, during the period of Rodham's trading, Refco was under investigation by the Mercantile Exchange for systematic violations of its margin trading rules and reporting requirements regarding cattle trading.[12][7] In December 1979, the exchange issued a three-year suspension to Bone and a $250,000 fine of Refco (at the time, the largest such penalty imposed by the exchange).[12][7]
The trading practices in Refco's Springdale, Arkansas, office, which Bone was the manager of,[12] came under investigation following the October 1979 collapse of cattle prices, which caused traders with that office to lose close to $20 million.[7] A number of the traders, including Blair, sued Refco and its chair, Thomas Dittmer, as well as Bone, on grounds of having manipulated prices and thus precipitating the collapse.[7][18] Blair and Refco reached an out-of-court settlement.[7] In a case that went to trial, an Arkansas jury found in favor of some of the traders and against Refco and Dittmer, but that verdict was later overturned by a federal appellate court.[7] Court documents detailed some of the alleged trading practices at Refco, including block trading, end-of-day allocation, backdating of trades, and waived margin calls.[7] Two brokers at Springdale, Bill McCurdy and Steven Johns, testifying about another trader's case, said they participated in a cover-up of block trading on a day in June 1979 that happens to coincide with the opening of what would become Rodham's single most profitable trade.[7]
After the Rodham trading matter became public, Leo Melamed, a former chairman of the Mercantile Exchange, was brought in by request of the White House to review the trading records. On April 11, 1994, he said that the whole matter was "a tempest in a teapot" and that while her brokers had not required her to provide typical margin cushions, she had not knowingly benefited.[8] On May 26, 1994, after the new records concerning the larger Blair trades came to light, he said "I have no reason to change my original assessment. Mrs. Clinton violated no rules in the course of her transactions."[13] But as to the question of whether she had been allocated profits from larger block trades, he said of the new accounting, "It doesn't suggest that there was allocation, and it doesn't prove there wasn't,"[19] an assessment of uncertainty shared by Merton Miller, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.[19]
Clinton responses[edit]
Hillary Clinton's defenders, including White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, maintained throughout that she had made her own decisions, that her own money was constantly at risk, and that she made both winning and losing trades throughout the ten months.[20] Regarding suggestions that Blair had favored Clinton so that Tyson Foods could gain influence with Governor Clinton, they pointed out that Tyson had, in fact, later opposed Clinton during his 1980 re-election bid, an observation the First Lady had also made at her news conference.[10][20]
Clinton's defenders also stressed that Blair and others stayed in the market longer than Rodham and lost a good amount of what they had earlier made later that summer and fall, showing that the risk was real.[3] Indeed, some reports had Blair losing $15 million[18] and Bone was reported as bankrupt.[6]
Official findings[edit]
There never was any official governmental investigation into,[3] or findings about, or charges brought regarding Hillary Rodham's cattle futures trading[5] (as opposed to Refco practices overall); furthermore, by the time her trading results became known, 15 years had passed and statute of limitations issues may have been pertinent. Melamed's statements were sometimes used as a proxy "official" finding by the Merc, although he was a private consultant by then and was brought in by the White House.
References[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b c Claudia Rosett, "Hillary's Bull Market", The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2000. Accessed July 14, 2007.
Jump up ^ Clinton, Bill (2004). My Life. Knopf Publishing Group. ISBN 0-375-41457-6. p. 244.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2003). Living History. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-2224-5. pp. 86–87.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i Bernstein, Carl (2007). A Woman in Charge: The Life of Hillary Rodham Clinton. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-40766-9. pp. 134–138.
^ Jump up to: a b c Gerth, Jeff; Don Van Natta, Jr. (2007). Her Way: The Hopes and Ambitions of Hillary Rodham Clinton. New York: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-01742-6., pp. 73–76.
^ Jump up to: a b c Jeff Gerth, " Top Arkansas Lawyer Helped Hillary Clinton Turn Big Profit", The New York Times, March 18, 1994. Accessed July 14, 2007.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j k l Bill Montague; Kevin Johnson, "Commodities trading saga: Pieces still missing", USA Today, April 25, 1994. Accessed December 14, 2012.
^ Jump up to: a b Gwen Ifill, " Hillary Clinton Didn't Report $6,498 Profit In Commodities Account, White House Says", The New York Times, April 12, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
Jump up ^ Bob Herbert, "The Circus That Is Whitewater", The New York Times, March 20, 1994. Accessed April 6, 2008.
^ Jump up to: a b c d Gwen Ifill, "Hillary Clinton Takes Questions on Whitewater", The New York Times, April 23, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
Jump up ^ Michael Duffy, "Open and Unflappable", Time, May 2, 1994. Accessed July 16, 2007.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Mark Hosenball, Rich Thomas, and Eleanor Clift, "Hillary's Adventures In Cattle Futures Land", Newsweek, April 11, 1994. Accessed March 2, 2009.
^ Jump up to: a b c d Charles R. Babcock, "Hillary Clinton Futures Trades Detailed", The Washington Post, May 27, 1994. Accessed July 14, 2007.
Jump up ^ Anderson, Seth C.; Jackson, John D.; Steagall, Jeffrey W. (Fall 1994). "A Note on Odds in the Cattle Futures Market". Journal of Economics and Finance 18 (3): 357–365.
Jump up ^ Edward Chancellor, Devil Take The Hindmost : A History Of Financial Speculation. Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1999.
^ Jump up to: a b Caroline Baum, Victor Niederhoffer, "Herd Instincts: Hillary's Investment Profits", National Review, February 20, 1995.
Jump up ^ "Hillary Clinton's Cattle Futures Trading Profits", Marshall Magazine, Winter 1998.
^ Jump up to: a b Roger Morris, Partners in Power: The Clintons and Their America. Henry Holt, 1996. ISBN 0-8050-2804-8, p. 233.
^ Jump up to: a b Stephen Engelberg, "New Records Outline Favor for Hillary Clinton on Trades", The New York Times, May 27, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
^ Jump up to: a b " No One Bribed Anyone in Clinton Trading", Lloyd Cutler (letter to the editor), The New York Times, June 3, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
[hide] v t e
Hillary Rodham Clinton
67th United States Secretary of State (2009–2013) U.S. Senator from New York (2001–2009) First Lady of the United States (1993–2001)
Secretary of State
Tenure as Secretary Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration Hillary Doctrine Email system
U.S. Senator
Senate career Family Entertainment Protection Act Flag Protection Act of 2005
First Lady
1993 health care reform Hillaryland Travel office controversy FBI files controversy "Vast right-wing conspiracy" Vital Voices Save America's Treasures State Children's Health Insurance Program Adoption and Safe Families Act Foster Care Independence Act White House Millennium Council National Millennium Trail
Arkansas
Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families Rose Law Firm Legal Services Corporation Whitewater controversy Cattle futures controversy
Philanthropic
Clinton Foundation
Speeches and policies
Political positions "Women's Rights Are Human Rights" (1995)
Writings
Bibliography Senior thesis (1969) Scholarly articles It Takes a Village (1996) Dear Socks, Dear Buddy (1998) An Invitation to the White House (2000) Living History (2003) Hard Choices (2014)
Electoral history
New York senatorial election, 2000 2006 Presidential campaign, 2008 primaries debates endorsements HillRaisers Democratic National Convention Presidential campaign, 2016
Legacy
Awards and honors Books about Saturday Night Live parodies
Family
Bill Clinton (husband presidency) Chelsea Clinton (daughter) Hugh E. Rodham (father) Dorothy Howell Rodham (mother) Hugh Rodham (brother) Tony Rodham (brother) Socks (cat) Buddy (dog)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In 1978 and 1979, lawyer and First Lady of Arkansas Hillary Rodham engaged in a series of trades of cattle futures contracts. Her initial $1,000 investment had generated nearly $100,000 when she stopped trading after ten months. In 1994, after Hillary Rodham Clinton had become First Lady of the United States, the trading became the subject of considerable controversy regarding the likelihood of such a spectacular rate of return, possible conflict of interest, and allegations of disguised bribery,[1] allegations that Clinton strongly denied. There were no official investigations of the trading and Clinton was never charged with any wrongdoing.
Contents [hide]
1 Trades and first exposure
2 Likelihood of results
3 Merc and Melamed investigations
4 Clinton responses
5 Official findings
6 References
Trades and first exposure[edit]
Hillary Rodham and Bill Clinton lived in this 980 square feet (91 m2) house in the Hillcrest neighborhood of Little Rock from 1977 to 1979 while he was Arkansas Attorney General.[2] The couple's modest circumstances led Rodham to seek investment income.
Rodham had no experience in such financial instruments. Bill Clinton's salary as Arkansas Attorney General and then Governor of Arkansas was modest and Rodham said she was interested in building a financial cushion for the future[3][4] (the ill-fated Whitewater Development Corporation would be another such effort from this time[3]). Starting in October 1978, when Bill Clinton was Attorney General and on the verge of being elected Governor,[1] she was guided by James Blair, a friend, lawyer, outside counsel to Tyson Foods, Arkansas's largest employer, and, since 1977,[5] a futures trader who was doing so well he encouraged friends and family to enter the commodity markets as well.[3][4] Blair in turn traded through, and relied upon cattle markets expertise from, broker Robert L. "Red" Bone of Refco, a former Tyson executive and professional poker player who was a World Series of Poker semifinalist.[6][4]
Rodham later wrote that she educated herself about the market and followed it closely, winning and losing money.[3] By January 1979, she was up $26,000;[4] but later, she would lose $16,000 in a single trade.[4] At one point she owed in excess of $100,000 to Refco as part of covering losses, but no margin calls were made by Refco against her.[4] Near the end of the trading, Blair correctly sold short and gave her a $40,000 gain in one afternoon.[4] In July 1979,[1] once she became pregnant with Chelsea Clinton, "I lost my nerve for gambling [and] walked away from the table $100,000 ahead."[3] She briefly traded sugar futures contracts and other non-cattle commodities in October 1979, but more conservatively, through Stephens Inc.[4][7] During this period she made about $6,500 in gains (which she failed to pay taxes on at the time, consequently later paying some $14,600 in federal and state tax penalties in the 1990s).[8][7] Once her daughter was born in February 1980, she moved all her commodities gains into U.S. Treasury Bonds.[4]
The profits made during the cattle trading first came to public light in a March 18, 1994 report by The New York Times, which had been reviewing the Clintons' financial records for two months.[6] It immediately gained considerable press attention, and coincided with the beginning of congressional hearings over the Whitewater controversy.[9] Media pressure continued to build, and on April 22, 1994, Hillary Clinton gave an unusual press conference under a portrait of Abraham Lincoln in the State Dining Room of the White House, to address questions on both matters; it was broadcast live by CBS, NBC, ABC, and CNN.[10] In it she said she had done the trading, but often relying upon the advice of Blair, and having him place orders for her; she said she did not believe she had received preferential treatment in the process.[10] She also downplayed the dangers of such trading: "I didn't think it was that big a risk. [Blair] and the people he was talking with knew what they were doing."[5] Afterwards she won media praise for the manner in which she conducted herself during this, her first adversarial press conference;[10] Time called her "open, candid, but above all unflappable ... the real message was her attitude and her poise. The confiding tone and relaxed body language ... immediately drew approving reviews."[11]
Likelihood of results[edit]
Various publications sought to analyze the likelihood of Rodham's successful results. The editor of the Journal of Futures Markets said in April 1994, "This is like buying ice skates one day and entering the Olympics a day later. She took some extraordinary risks."[12] USA Today concluded in April 1994 after a four-week study that "Hillary Rodham Clinton had some special treatment while winning a small fortune in commodities."[7] According to The Washington Post's May 1994 analysis, "while Clinton's account was wildly successful to an outsider, it was small compared to what others were making in the cattle futures market in the 1978–79 period." However, the Post's comparison was of absolute profits, not necessarily percentage rate of return.[13] In a Fall 1994 paper for the Journal of Economics and Finance, economists from the University of North Florida and Auburn University investigated the odds of gaining a hundred-fold return in the cattle futures market during the period in question. Using a model that was stated to give the hypothetical investor the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the odds of such a return happening were at best 1 in 31 trillion.[14]
Financial writer Edward Chancellor noted in 1999 that Clinton made her money by betting "on the short side at a time when cattle prices doubled."[15] Bloomberg News columnist Caroline Baum and hedge fund manager Victor Niederhoffer published a detailed 1995 analysis in National Review that found typical patterns and behaviors in commodities trading not met and concluded that her explanations for her results were highly implausible.[16] Possibilities were raised that broker actions such as front running of trades, or a long straddle with the winning positions thereof assigned to a favored client, had taken place.[13][16]
In a 1998 article, Marshall Magazine, a publication of the Marshall School of Business, sought to frame the trading, the nature of the results, and possible explanations for them:
These results are quite remarkable. Two-thirds of her trades showed a profit by the end of the day she made them and 80 percent were ultimately profitable. Many of her trades took place at or near the best prices of the day.
Only four explanations can account for these remarkable results. Blair may have been an exceptionally good trader. Hillary Clinton may have been exceptionally lucky. Blair may have been front-running other orders. Or Blair may have arranged to have a broker fraudulently assign trades to benefit Clinton's account.[17]
Merc and Melamed investigations[edit]
Chicago Mercantile Exchange records indicated that $40,000 of her profits came from larger trades initiated by James Blair. According to exchange records, "Red" Bone, the commodities broker that facilitated the trades on behalf of Refco, reportedly because Blair was a good client, allowed Rodham to maintain her positions even though she did not have enough money in her account to cover her activity. For example, she was allowed to order 10 cattle futures contracts, normally a $12,000 investment, in her first commodity trade in 1978 although she had only $1,000 in her account at the time.[13] Bone denied any wrongdoing in conjunction with Rodham's trading and said he did not recall ever dealing with Rodham personally.[7][12]
As it happened, during the period of Rodham's trading, Refco was under investigation by the Mercantile Exchange for systematic violations of its margin trading rules and reporting requirements regarding cattle trading.[12][7] In December 1979, the exchange issued a three-year suspension to Bone and a $250,000 fine of Refco (at the time, the largest such penalty imposed by the exchange).[12][7]
The trading practices in Refco's Springdale, Arkansas, office, which Bone was the manager of,[12] came under investigation following the October 1979 collapse of cattle prices, which caused traders with that office to lose close to $20 million.[7] A number of the traders, including Blair, sued Refco and its chair, Thomas Dittmer, as well as Bone, on grounds of having manipulated prices and thus precipitating the collapse.[7][18] Blair and Refco reached an out-of-court settlement.[7] In a case that went to trial, an Arkansas jury found in favor of some of the traders and against Refco and Dittmer, but that verdict was later overturned by a federal appellate court.[7] Court documents detailed some of the alleged trading practices at Refco, including block trading, end-of-day allocation, backdating of trades, and waived margin calls.[7] Two brokers at Springdale, Bill McCurdy and Steven Johns, testifying about another trader's case, said they participated in a cover-up of block trading on a day in June 1979 that happens to coincide with the opening of what would become Rodham's single most profitable trade.[7]
After the Rodham trading matter became public, Leo Melamed, a former chairman of the Mercantile Exchange, was brought in by request of the White House to review the trading records. On April 11, 1994, he said that the whole matter was "a tempest in a teapot" and that while her brokers had not required her to provide typical margin cushions, she had not knowingly benefited.[8] On May 26, 1994, after the new records concerning the larger Blair trades came to light, he said "I have no reason to change my original assessment. Mrs. Clinton violated no rules in the course of her transactions."[13] But as to the question of whether she had been allocated profits from larger block trades, he said of the new accounting, "It doesn't suggest that there was allocation, and it doesn't prove there wasn't,"[19] an assessment of uncertainty shared by Merton Miller, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.[19]
Clinton responses[edit]
Hillary Clinton's defenders, including White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, maintained throughout that she had made her own decisions, that her own money was constantly at risk, and that she made both winning and losing trades throughout the ten months.[20] Regarding suggestions that Blair had favored Clinton so that Tyson Foods could gain influence with Governor Clinton, they pointed out that Tyson had, in fact, later opposed Clinton during his 1980 re-election bid, an observation the First Lady had also made at her news conference.[10][20]
Clinton's defenders also stressed that Blair and others stayed in the market longer than Rodham and lost a good amount of what they had earlier made later that summer and fall, showing that the risk was real.[3] Indeed, some reports had Blair losing $15 million[18] and Bone was reported as bankrupt.[6]
Official findings[edit]
There never was any official governmental investigation into,[3] or findings about, or charges brought regarding Hillary Rodham's cattle futures trading[5] (as opposed to Refco practices overall); furthermore, by the time her trading results became known, 15 years had passed and statute of limitations issues may have been pertinent. Melamed's statements were sometimes used as a proxy "official" finding by the Merc, although he was a private consultant by then and was brought in by the White House.
References[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b c Claudia Rosett, "Hillary's Bull Market", The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2000. Accessed July 14, 2007.
Jump up ^ Clinton, Bill (2004). My Life. Knopf Publishing Group. ISBN 0-375-41457-6. p. 244.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2003). Living History. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-2224-5. pp. 86–87.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i Bernstein, Carl (2007). A Woman in Charge: The Life of Hillary Rodham Clinton. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-40766-9. pp. 134–138.
^ Jump up to: a b c Gerth, Jeff; Don Van Natta, Jr. (2007). Her Way: The Hopes and Ambitions of Hillary Rodham Clinton. New York: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-01742-6., pp. 73–76.
^ Jump up to: a b c Jeff Gerth, " Top Arkansas Lawyer Helped Hillary Clinton Turn Big Profit", The New York Times, March 18, 1994. Accessed July 14, 2007.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j k l Bill Montague; Kevin Johnson, "Commodities trading saga: Pieces still missing", USA Today, April 25, 1994. Accessed December 14, 2012.
^ Jump up to: a b Gwen Ifill, " Hillary Clinton Didn't Report $6,498 Profit In Commodities Account, White House Says", The New York Times, April 12, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
Jump up ^ Bob Herbert, "The Circus That Is Whitewater", The New York Times, March 20, 1994. Accessed April 6, 2008.
^ Jump up to: a b c d Gwen Ifill, "Hillary Clinton Takes Questions on Whitewater", The New York Times, April 23, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
Jump up ^ Michael Duffy, "Open and Unflappable", Time, May 2, 1994. Accessed July 16, 2007.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Mark Hosenball, Rich Thomas, and Eleanor Clift, "Hillary's Adventures In Cattle Futures Land", Newsweek, April 11, 1994. Accessed March 2, 2009.
^ Jump up to: a b c d Charles R. Babcock, "Hillary Clinton Futures Trades Detailed", The Washington Post, May 27, 1994. Accessed July 14, 2007.
Jump up ^ Anderson, Seth C.; Jackson, John D.; Steagall, Jeffrey W. (Fall 1994). "A Note on Odds in the Cattle Futures Market". Journal of Economics and Finance 18 (3): 357–365.
Jump up ^ Edward Chancellor, Devil Take The Hindmost : A History Of Financial Speculation. Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1999.
^ Jump up to: a b Caroline Baum, Victor Niederhoffer, "Herd Instincts: Hillary's Investment Profits", National Review, February 20, 1995.
Jump up ^ "Hillary Clinton's Cattle Futures Trading Profits", Marshall Magazine, Winter 1998.
^ Jump up to: a b Roger Morris, Partners in Power: The Clintons and Their America. Henry Holt, 1996. ISBN 0-8050-2804-8, p. 233.
^ Jump up to: a b Stephen Engelberg, "New Records Outline Favor for Hillary Clinton on Trades", The New York Times, May 27, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
^ Jump up to: a b " No One Bribed Anyone in Clinton Trading", Lloyd Cutler (letter to the editor), The New York Times, June 3, 1994. Accessed July 15, 2007.
[hide] v t e
Hillary Rodham Clinton
67th United States Secretary of State (2009–2013) U.S. Senator from New York (2001–2009) First Lady of the United States (1993–2001)
Secretary of State
Tenure as Secretary Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration Hillary Doctrine Email system
U.S. Senator
Senate career Family Entertainment Protection Act Flag Protection Act of 2005
First Lady
1993 health care reform Hillaryland Travel office controversy FBI files controversy "Vast right-wing conspiracy" Vital Voices Save America's Treasures State Children's Health Insurance Program Adoption and Safe Families Act Foster Care Independence Act White House Millennium Council National Millennium Trail
Arkansas
Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families Rose Law Firm Legal Services Corporation Whitewater controversy Cattle futures controversy
Philanthropic
Clinton Foundation
Speeches and policies
Political positions "Women's Rights Are Human Rights" (1995)
Writings
Bibliography Senior thesis (1969) Scholarly articles It Takes a Village (1996) Dear Socks, Dear Buddy (1998) An Invitation to the White House (2000) Living History (2003) Hard Choices (2014)
Electoral history
New York senatorial election, 2000 2006 Presidential campaign, 2008 primaries debates endorsements HillRaisers Democratic National Convention Presidential campaign, 2016
Legacy
Awards and honors Books about Saturday Night Live parodies
Family
Bill Clinton (husband presidency) Chelsea Clinton (daughter) Hugh E. Rodham (father) Dorothy Howell Rodham (mother) Hugh Rodham (brother) Tony Rodham (brother) Socks (cat) Buddy (dog)
Sunday, October 11, 2015
Saturday, October 10, 2015
Friday, October 9, 2015
Wednesday, October 7, 2015
If you get all of your news from mainstream media and cable TV infotainment, then you’re probably unaware that glyphosate (the active ingredient in RoundUp herbicide) has been linked to cancer. The World Health Organization stated in March that glyphosate is a probable carcinogen, and California will soon label it as such.
The MSM addict will also be unaware that long-term exposure to glyphosate—even tiny amounts deemed “safe” by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—can lead to liver and kidney damage.
The “safe” level of glyphosate for U.S. drinking water was set at 0.7 ug/L in 1994, and this has not been revised, despite studies over the years showing glyphosate’s toxicity. For comparison, the European Union’s safe glyphosate level for drinking water is 0.1 ug/L.
Several countries have banned or restricted the herbicide’s use, and other leading nations are considering legislative bans.
Nowhere is glyphosate more prevalent than in the U.S., which uses 20% of the world’s RoundUp, or more than 280 million pounds per year. These incredible figures have to do with the fact that Monsanto’s GMO “RoundUp Ready” brands now comprise most of the corn and soybean crops grown in the U.S. This has brought staggering profits to the multinational corporation that now controls vast swaths of the global food supply.
As more research is carried out, we are finding that glyphosate is far more toxic than its maker Monsanto, along with corrupted federal agencies, have led us to believe.
Now the grand deception has been confirmed.
Forty years ago the biotech giant began its own research on glyphosate, and these studies have just been unearthed. The documents reveal that Monsanto always knew about the human health hazards of glyphosate.
“There is now an enormous cache of evidence on both scientific and legal grounds that Monsanto in fact conducted numerous studies in the 1970s and 1980s on glyphosate’s toxicity and health risks and intentionally sealed this research from independent and public review and scrutiny.”
Equally astonishing is the fact that this body of research was given to EPA, who hid it from the public at Monsanto’s demand on the basis of proprietary trade secrets.
The EPA sat on these documents for decades, but the dedication of independent research scientist Anthony Samsel pierced that shroud of secrecy. After trying unsuccessfully to gain access through Freedom of Information requests, Samsel managed to acquire the research documents through his senator’s office.
Samsel and his co-investigator, Dr. Stephanie Seneff of MIT, analyzed 15,000 pages of scientific documents covering Monsanto’s complete glyphosate research. They have concluded that Monsanto’s claims of safety are patently false, and it knew that glyphosate was responsible for a variety of cancers and organ failures.
When the company’s research showed adverse effects, it used deceitful tricks to hide and obscure those conclusions, so the lackluster EPA would simply nod its head in acquiescence.
“Monsanto misrepresented the data and deliberately covered up data to bring the product [glyphosate] to market,” said Samsel in an interview.
Samsel and Seneff will be presenting their findings in a peer-reviewed paper approved for publication this month, titled Glyphosate Pathways to Modern Diseases IV: Cancer and Related Pathologies.
In the meantime, analyst Richard Gale and documentarian Gary Null provide a comprehensive review of the scientists’ devastating findings.
“In order to minimize and cancel out its adverse findings, Samsel explained that Monsanto had relied upon earlier historical animal control data, toxicological research with lab animals afflicted with cancer and organ failures, and completely unrelated to glyphosate. In some cases the control animals displayed kidney, liver and pancreatic diseases. Many of Monsanto’s own studies required the inclusion of extraneous studies in order to cancel out damaging results. This is not an uncommon industry habit, particularly in toxicological science. It enables corporations to mask undesirable outcomes and make claims that observable illnesses and disease are spontaneous occurrences without known causal factors. Frequently, Monsanto would have to rely on three external control studies to negate the adverse effects of a single one of its own. Samsel found other incidences in Monsanto’s data where 5, 7 and in one case 11 unrelated studies were necessary to diminish the severity of its own findings. In effect, glyphosate received licensure based upon a platform of junk tobacco science. By ignoring cause and effect relationships behind the onset of multiple cancers and other life-threatening diseases throughout many of its research trials, Monsanto engaged in a radical scientific denialism that has since raked in tens of billions of dollars.
In addition, Monsanto’s studies included doses from low to high range. Samsel observed that low glyphosate doses were equally if not more toxic than higher doses. The company later discontinued low dose trials, relying only on higher levels because it is customarily assumed to have greater toxicological risks. Samsel’s observation has recently been confirmed by a study published in the August issue of the Environmental Health Journal by scientists at Kings College London and the University of Caen in France. The two year study found that glyphosate administered at an ultra low dose of 0.1 ppb (the EU’s safety limit) in drinking water altered over 4000 gene clusters in the livers and kidneys of rats. These alterations, the study reports, “were consistent with fibrosis, necrosis, phospholipidosis, mitochondria membrane dysfunction and ischemia.”[14] Consequently low doses of Roundup are far more toxic than US EPA limits.
During its years investigating glyphosate’s bioactivity, Monsanto conducted hundreds of trials on mice, rats, beagle dogs, rabbits and other life. Among the many cancers and diseases Monsanto’s own research found associated with glyphosate are:
Adenoma cancer in the pituitary gland
Glioma tumors in the brain
Read more at http://thefreethoughtproject.com/unearthed-documents-reveal-monsanto-epa-knew-glyphosates-toxic-carcinogenic-effects/#MHFj0bG7H5mG5ZBG.99
The MSM addict will also be unaware that long-term exposure to glyphosate—even tiny amounts deemed “safe” by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—can lead to liver and kidney damage.
The “safe” level of glyphosate for U.S. drinking water was set at 0.7 ug/L in 1994, and this has not been revised, despite studies over the years showing glyphosate’s toxicity. For comparison, the European Union’s safe glyphosate level for drinking water is 0.1 ug/L.
Several countries have banned or restricted the herbicide’s use, and other leading nations are considering legislative bans.
Nowhere is glyphosate more prevalent than in the U.S., which uses 20% of the world’s RoundUp, or more than 280 million pounds per year. These incredible figures have to do with the fact that Monsanto’s GMO “RoundUp Ready” brands now comprise most of the corn and soybean crops grown in the U.S. This has brought staggering profits to the multinational corporation that now controls vast swaths of the global food supply.
As more research is carried out, we are finding that glyphosate is far more toxic than its maker Monsanto, along with corrupted federal agencies, have led us to believe.
Now the grand deception has been confirmed.
Forty years ago the biotech giant began its own research on glyphosate, and these studies have just been unearthed. The documents reveal that Monsanto always knew about the human health hazards of glyphosate.
“There is now an enormous cache of evidence on both scientific and legal grounds that Monsanto in fact conducted numerous studies in the 1970s and 1980s on glyphosate’s toxicity and health risks and intentionally sealed this research from independent and public review and scrutiny.”
Equally astonishing is the fact that this body of research was given to EPA, who hid it from the public at Monsanto’s demand on the basis of proprietary trade secrets.
The EPA sat on these documents for decades, but the dedication of independent research scientist Anthony Samsel pierced that shroud of secrecy. After trying unsuccessfully to gain access through Freedom of Information requests, Samsel managed to acquire the research documents through his senator’s office.
Samsel and his co-investigator, Dr. Stephanie Seneff of MIT, analyzed 15,000 pages of scientific documents covering Monsanto’s complete glyphosate research. They have concluded that Monsanto’s claims of safety are patently false, and it knew that glyphosate was responsible for a variety of cancers and organ failures.
When the company’s research showed adverse effects, it used deceitful tricks to hide and obscure those conclusions, so the lackluster EPA would simply nod its head in acquiescence.
“Monsanto misrepresented the data and deliberately covered up data to bring the product [glyphosate] to market,” said Samsel in an interview.
Samsel and Seneff will be presenting their findings in a peer-reviewed paper approved for publication this month, titled Glyphosate Pathways to Modern Diseases IV: Cancer and Related Pathologies.
In the meantime, analyst Richard Gale and documentarian Gary Null provide a comprehensive review of the scientists’ devastating findings.
“In order to minimize and cancel out its adverse findings, Samsel explained that Monsanto had relied upon earlier historical animal control data, toxicological research with lab animals afflicted with cancer and organ failures, and completely unrelated to glyphosate. In some cases the control animals displayed kidney, liver and pancreatic diseases. Many of Monsanto’s own studies required the inclusion of extraneous studies in order to cancel out damaging results. This is not an uncommon industry habit, particularly in toxicological science. It enables corporations to mask undesirable outcomes and make claims that observable illnesses and disease are spontaneous occurrences without known causal factors. Frequently, Monsanto would have to rely on three external control studies to negate the adverse effects of a single one of its own. Samsel found other incidences in Monsanto’s data where 5, 7 and in one case 11 unrelated studies were necessary to diminish the severity of its own findings. In effect, glyphosate received licensure based upon a platform of junk tobacco science. By ignoring cause and effect relationships behind the onset of multiple cancers and other life-threatening diseases throughout many of its research trials, Monsanto engaged in a radical scientific denialism that has since raked in tens of billions of dollars.
In addition, Monsanto’s studies included doses from low to high range. Samsel observed that low glyphosate doses were equally if not more toxic than higher doses. The company later discontinued low dose trials, relying only on higher levels because it is customarily assumed to have greater toxicological risks. Samsel’s observation has recently been confirmed by a study published in the August issue of the Environmental Health Journal by scientists at Kings College London and the University of Caen in France. The two year study found that glyphosate administered at an ultra low dose of 0.1 ppb (the EU’s safety limit) in drinking water altered over 4000 gene clusters in the livers and kidneys of rats. These alterations, the study reports, “were consistent with fibrosis, necrosis, phospholipidosis, mitochondria membrane dysfunction and ischemia.”[14] Consequently low doses of Roundup are far more toxic than US EPA limits.
During its years investigating glyphosate’s bioactivity, Monsanto conducted hundreds of trials on mice, rats, beagle dogs, rabbits and other life. Among the many cancers and diseases Monsanto’s own research found associated with glyphosate are:
Adenoma cancer in the pituitary gland
Glioma tumors in the brain
Read more at http://thefreethoughtproject.com/unearthed-documents-reveal-monsanto-epa-knew-glyphosates-toxic-carcinogenic-effects/#MHFj0bG7H5mG5ZBG.99
Tuesday, October 6, 2015
Monday, October 5, 2015
Sunday, October 4, 2015
Saturday, October 3, 2015
Friday, October 2, 2015
the chinese have secretly placed backdoor trojan chips in most computers
http://www.dailyartisan.com/news/and-now-the-manchurian-microchip/
Thursday, October 1, 2015
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